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“Kärnten” = Austria, “Koroška” = Yugoslavia?  
A Novel Perspective on the 1920  
Carinthian Plebiscite 
Guido Tiemann ∗ 
Abstract: »„Kärnten“ = Österreich, „Koroška“ = Jugoslawien? Eine neue Per-
spektive auf die Kärntner Volksabstimmung von 1920«. In 1920, the Carinthian 
plebiscite was organized to decide whether an ethnically and/or linguistically 
heterogeneous part of South-East Carinthia was to be part of the newly estab-
lished German-Austrian rump state or of the newly established Kingdom of 
Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (SHS). Although ethnic or linguistic “Slovenes” con-
stituted a majority of almost 70 percent within the referendum zone, more 
than 59 percent of the voters opted to integrate into Austria. The allegedly vic-
torious German side quickly turned the choice for Austria into a nationalist 
narrative fueled by claims of cultural superiority, fostered by the invention of 
an integrated, publicly funded memorial culture, and vigorously defended 
against any objections or revisionism from “the outside.” In this paper, howev-
er, we utilize an ecological inference model to show that nationalist authors on 
both sides severely overrated the causal impact and empirical significance of 
the alleged ethnic cleavage, underestimated the share of “Slovenian” voters, 
and overestimated the share of “German” voters that selected to join the Aus-
trian state. Instead of the reported 10,000, more than 13,000 Slovenes, roughly 
60 percent, had voted for Austria, while only 9,000 German-speaking voters, 
roughly 75 percent, supported Austria. 
Keywords: Ethnic groups, electoral research, referendum, ecological inference, 
Carinthian plebiscite, Carinthia, Austria, Yugoslavia. 
1. A Matter of Choice 
Almost exactly one hundred years ago, the Carinthian plebiscite was held. The 
demise and break-up of the multi-ethnic Austria-Hungary and the emergence of 
various successor states after World War I led to numerous territorial disputes, 
contested borders, and (even to militarized) border conflicts upon its previous 
territories. Within Carinthia, the plebiscite has since been a symbol of local 
identity, of Germannationalist celebration, and of Germanic triumphalism. 
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Likewise, the referendum, its aftermath, and its canonization by Carinthian, 
Austrian, Slovenian, and international historians has been turned into a focal 
point of bitter division, of an institutionalized memorial culture, and principled, 
ideological, and deeply polarized political, public, and scientific debates (cf., 
among many others, Neumann 1997; Ogris et al. 2019; the contributions to two 
edited volumes provide a first glance of past and present controversies; cf. 
Rumpler 1981; Valentin, Haiden, and Maier 2002).  
The Carinthian plebiscite was a notable historical event for many reasons: 
substantively, it marks one of the first instances when territorial borders, in-
stead of being drawn top-down by ruling elites or war profiteers, were settled 
bottom-up by a vote of directly affected citizens. Formally, the referendum 
marked also the first time ever when female citizens in South-East Carinthia 
were officially enfranchised and given the right to participate in political life. 
Ideologically, however, local authors focused on other aspects: the German-
nationalist Carinthian historiography has been drafted, canonized, and vigor-
ously defended by a tiny, sectarian group of publicists. Slovenian historians 
entered the fray and provided heated refutations. Below the line, this rift pro-
duced a polarized, bitter debate, but at the same time yielded a stunning short-
age of quality research and fruitful scientific discussion. 
Frequently, nationalist accounts do not care too much about the preferences 
of individual citizens or their organization into social and political groups. 
Notwithstanding an abundance of publications on the Carinthian border conflict 
and plebiscite, evidence-based research on the determinants of electoral choice 
has not only been restricted by the provision of extensive and valid data, but 
has also been held back by the scope and interests of key proponents in publi-
cistic controversies. The tallies of the referendum are formally uncontested: 
among 39,291 local citizens who were legally enfranchised, 22,025 (59.04 
percent) selected Austria and 15,279 (40.96 percent) chose Yugoslavia. Adopt-
ing the last Austro-Hungarian census as a yardstick, the choice for Austria was 
only possible because of the support of a significant and sizable share of ethnic 
and/ or linguistic Slovenes. Capitalizing predominantly, if not solely, on the 
ethnic underpinnings of vote choice, German-nationalist authors in Carinthia 
therefore claimed that their side was able to sway 10,000 (Wutte 1922, 180; 
1943, 398; Ogris 1981), 10,500, or 11,000 (Wadl 2019, 181) “Slovenes.” 
This article utilizes some updates in the historical data and, perhaps more 
importantly, modern and novel techniques of statistical analysis to shed some 
additional light onto the determinants of electoral behavior in the Carinthian 
plebiscite and to evaluate the significance of ethnic divisions vis-à-vis other 
drivers of electoral choice. Focusing on the 1910 Austro-Hungarian census and 
the official returns of the 1920 referendum from 51 local communities (Ger-
man, “Gemeinden”), we apply Gary King’s (1997) solution to the ecological 
inference problem in order to obtain more reliable estimates for the decisions 
by the German and Slovene population segments. These complex, but well-
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established statistical tools provide a feasible way forward, whenever research-
ers need to use aggregate data in order to draw inferences about individual 
behavior. In electoral research, applications have become quite common in 
historical cases when survey data is not at hand (cf. King et al. 2008). Ecologi-
cal inference is also required, when survey-based responses are available and 
feasible, but most likely biased. Thus, no other field has seen more applications 
of ecological inference than the evaluation of and litigation on the U.S. Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 which concern aspects of race and vote choice or race and 
voter registration in American politics (cf., for instance, the almost countless 
examples in Achen and Shivley 1995; King 1997; King, Tanner, and Rosen 
2004; Wakefield 2004; Imai, Lu, and Strauss 2007).  
Building upon empirical data and modern statistical tools, we are able to 
show that previous guesses by biased and nationalist historians systematically 
underestimate the share of linguistic Slovenians that opted for Austria, and 
almost entirely blank out the substantive portions of Germans that desired to 
become a part of Yugoslavia. Our assessments differ significantly from the 
previously published numbers and reveal that as many as 51 percent of the 
Slovene- and less than 77 percent of the German-speaking citizens opted to join 
the new Austrian rump state. These findings do not only enable us to rectify 
biased and malinformed guesses on electoral choice that dominate the immi-
nent literature. The updated figures cogently demonstrate that the Carinthian 
plebiscite, in contrast to the misrepresentations by parochial pride and historio-
graphic prejudice, was by no means exclusively or even predominantly deter-
mined by ethnic and/ or linguistic cleavages. It neither delivered a race-based 
armageddon between the German defenders and Slavic invaders of Carinthia, 
nor was it a contest for loyalty among different peoples and polities. Rather, the 
referendum was usual politics when different ethnic, economic, ideological, 
linguistic, and social groups pursued different interests and conflicting goals. 
Nothing special. 
Before proceeding, we need to add some caveat to this introduction, to our 
vocabulary, and to our general treatment of the Carinthian plebiscite. By defini-
tion, this contribution to positive political science addresses what is there, what 
is documented, and what is thus leftover for any meaningful and systematic 
analysis at the present day. Throughout this paper, we identify “Germans” and 
“Slovenes” living in Carinthia by their self-declared conversational language as 
recorded in the census. While we acknowledge the ideological interest of these 
surveys and the direction of implied measurement bias, we can do very little to 
quantify the magnitude of these distortions. Likewise, we are well aware that 
contributions from different angles and backgrounds tend to consider Germans 
and/ or Slovenes living in Carinthia as ethnic, linguistic, ethno-linguistic, as 
majority or minority groups, or refer to official labels such as “Volksgruppe,” 
our positivist perspective prevents us from suggesting unfounded speculations 
about some “true nature” of these groups. We do not plan to attach any label to 
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anyone (or any group), and instead use all the above expressions in an ex-
changeable manner. Finally, to prevent some awkward wording and writing, 
we do not care too much about changing labels of the involved states and simp-
ly write “Austria” and “Yugoslavia” throughout this paper. 
2. Organizing a Referendum 
The defeat and break-up of Austria-Hungary in and after World War I resulted 
in the emergence of numerous successor states and sparked territorial conflict 
among the German-Austrian rump state and the newly established Yugoslavian 
kingdom. These border struggles were from the outset decided within two 
inter-linked arenas: one was local and concerned administrative affairs, clashes 
among organized Yugoslavian military with improvised Austro-Carinthian 
defense forces, and intense propaganda efforts by both sides; the other was 
international and addressed the complex negotiations among the victorious 
allied forces at the Paris Peace Conferences. 
The newly founded Yugoslavian kingdom initially strived for control and 
possession of the entire Carinthian territory, but later restricted its claims to an 
ethnically heterogeneous part of South-East Carinthia. So as to reinforce and 
hedge these territorial claims, Yugoslavian police and military forces entered 
the disputed settlements on 5 November 1918, gained control over Arnoldstein/ 
Podklošter, Ferlach/ Borovlje, the Jaun Valley, and the Loibl Pass, and cap-
tured further contested areas. On 5 December 1918, the provisional German-
Carinthian government decided to counter the Yugoslavian police and army 
units with federal and improvised local troops. Depending on diverse ethno-
political, ideological, and national viewpoints, these events marked the begin-
ning of the Carinthian Defensive Struggle (German, “Kärntner Abwehr-
kampf”), the Struggle for the Northern Border (Slovenian, “boj za severno 
mejo”), or the Carinthian border conflict (which we prefer for this paper as the 
most impartial and unprejudiced label). In the course of these events, German-
Austrian units temporarily managed to cast Yugoslavian police and military out 
of the occupied communities and regions. In response, the much larger Yugo-
slavian kingdom mobilized additional troops, swept most of the Carinthian 
territories, and captured the capital Klagenfurt in May/ June 1919 (a much 
more detailed, albeit heavily biased account of these events is narrated by 
Wutte 1922, 1943).  
A key touchstone of dissent in current and modern historiography refers to 
the impact of these struggles on the results of the Paris Peace Conference. 
German-nationalist Carinthian authors have persistently tried to link both 
events and argued that the the military defense action (German, “Kärntner 
Abwehrkampf”) was a necessary condition for the granting and the implemen-
tation of the Carinthian plebiscite (cf., instead of many others, Kromer 1970; 
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Neumann 1997). Military clashes in the Klagenfurt Basin certainly alarmed the 
allied politicians and led to a fact-finding mission directed by the American Lt. 
Col. Sherman Miles. The main goal of these efforts was to look for a “good” 
border between the Austrian Republic and the Yugoslavian kingdom, which 
was based both on the right of ethnic and national self-determination and the 
consideration of geographical barriers which differentiated these territories. 
The initial reports were very much in favor of German-Carinthian interests 
when they underscored the economic and geographical unity of the Klagenfurt 
Basin, found that even many linguistic Slovenians gravitated towards the Aus-
trian Republic instead of the Yugoslavian kingdom, and considered the Kara-
wanks mountain range a natural barrier and, therefore, a “good” border 
(Carinthian historical journalism has extensively stressed the importance of the 
Miles Mission, and emphasized interventions by American diplomatic, mili-
tary, and political actors; cf. Wutte 1922, 1943; Kromer 1970; Neumann 1997). 
Negotiators at the Paris Peace Conferences unanimously agreed to hold a refer-
endum within the entire Klagenfurt Region on 12 May 1919 (Kromer 1970, 
155-6). However, interventions by Yugoslavian delegates for predominantly 
strategic reasons advocated and asserted a division of the common Klagenfurt 
Basin into two different electoral units or zones (Kromer 1970, 186-7).  
Figure 1: Mapping Two Referendum Zones 
  
Notes: Some explanations of the German notes to this map are in order: the hatched areas 
mark territories that have been “cut off” without holding a referendum, namely the Kanal 
valley (German, “Kanaltal”) became a part of Italy, and the parishes of Seeland/ Jezersko, 
Mießtal/ Mežiška, and Unterdrauburg/ Dravograd were incorporated into Yugoslavia. Moreo-
ver, the geographical borders of the referendum Zones I and II are clearly marked on the map. 
In the header, the German text reiterates the three stipulations for voter enrollment estab-
lished for the Carinthian plebiscite. 
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Figure 1 provides a geographical overview of these newly demarcated zones. 
Initially, a referendum was to be organized in Zone I or A which was consid-
ered asymmetrically dominated by the Slovene-speaking group that allegedly 
made up almost 70 percent of the local population. Note that Zone I comprised 
of the thinly populated Southern border lands and the cities of Bleiburg/ 
Pliberk, Ferlach/ Borovlje, Eisenkappel/ Železna Kapla, and Völkermarkt/ 
Velikovec. For administrative purposes, Zone I was subdivided into the dis-
tricts of Rosegg/ Rožek (A.), Ferlach/ Borovlje (B.), Bleiburg/ Pliberk (C.), and 
Völkermarkt/ Velikovec (D.). If, and only if, the first vote resulted in a decision 
to incorporate Zone I into Yugoslavia, another referendum was to be organized 
in the more North-Western Zone II which included the capital Klagenfurt. 
Unlike Zone I, a potential second referendum was from the outset considered a 
safe bet for the German-Austrian camp, because more than 90 percent of the 
population had been classified as German-speakers by the Habsburg census. 
Due to the results of the referendum in Zone I, the second round was never 
held.  
Basic stipulations concerning the holding of a referendum, its formal organ-
ization, and the geographical borders of the Klagenfurt Basin and the Zones I 
and II are laid out in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Articles 49 and 50 
(1919). Of course, the determination of active suffrage, i.e., the right to vote in 
the referendum, was a crucial and contested issue. Basic provisions for enfran-
chisement have also been established in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 
Article 50: 
1) eligible voters needed to have turned 20 years old before 1 January 1919, 
2) they needed to be permanent residents of the respective Zone I or II on 
the same day, and 
3) they either needed to be born or were required to have had permanent 
residency within the respective Zone since 1 January 1912. 
Both sides found ample reason to complain: while German nationalists were 
concerned about extending franchise to (allegedly Slovenian) citizens who had 
lived for only seven years in Zone I, Slovenian nationalists were bothered 
about elective franchise for (allegedly German) citizens who had been residents 
of Zone I at the beginning of 1919, but moved to another place or fled the local 
Yugoslavian authorities. For instance, Wadl (2019, 169) objects that many 
Slovenian immigrants had moved into Zone I before 1910 and thereby estab-
lished an additional pool of 5,000 (within the Völkermarkt/ Velikovec district), 
and 2,500 (Klagenfurt/ Celovec district) likely SHS supporters. In contrast, 
Pleterski (1970, 78; 2002, 241-2) argues that the Austrian side unlawfully 
enrolled thousands of formally disenfranchised voters, but apparently do not 
believe or claim that these alleged irregularities ultimately tilted the result of 
the referendum.  
Some final comments on franchise and voter enrollment are in order: the 
registration process was evidently complex and costly. It involved a lengthy 
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questionnaire and personal presence before a bi-national Austrian/ Yugoslavian 
commission which heard the applicants and, in case of a stalemate, deferred the 
cases to an allied body that took the final decision (cf. further formal details are 
provided by Wadl 2019, 169). Yet, this also implies that the extensive turnout 
of more than 95 percent in the referendum should not come as a surprise and 
cannot be meaningfully construed as empirical evidence of nationalist euphoria 
when the actual enrollment procedure per se was yet that lavish. Just to be sure, 
Austrian propaganda efforts successfully created the impression that voting 
was mandatory and fines for no-shows would be severe.  
Figure 2: Ballots and Voting 
 
Notes: German and Slovene slogans for “This is the way Carinthia wins.” Fräss-Ehrfeld (2010, 
170-83) notes that the Austrian side printed more than 600,000 copies of the above leaflet in 
order to instruct less than 40,000 registered voters. 
 
Figure 2 shows the two historical ballot papers each enrolled citizen was pro-
vided with: a green ballot, which represented the Austrian Republic, and a 
white ballot paper that stood for the Yugoslavian kingdom. Both political prop-
aganda by the interested sides and electoral engineering by the allied referen-
dum commission considered and respected that many local voters only had 
elementary levels of educational attainment and literacy. The formal voting 
procedure implied to tearing up the ballot of the rejected option and then to 
submitting both papers to the local election commission: i.e., selecting Austria 
meant to tearing up the white ballot, as suggested in Figure 2, while those who 
supported Yugoslavia were supposed to rip apart the green ballot. 
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3.  Determinants of Vote Choice 
Nationalist historiography, both on the Austrian and the Yugoslavian side, has 
often insinuated that vote choice in the referendum was predominantly, if not 
exclusively, determined by ethnic affiliation: those who indicated Slovenian as 
their conversational language were assumed to vote for Yugoslavia, those 
indicated to speak German were expected to cast a vote for Austria. These 
simplistic ideas were then quickly inweaved into grand nationalist stories on 
why the Austrian side managed to sway so many Slovenes for their cause, and 
why Yugoslavia lost so many of “its” votes to the other side. These one-
dimensional interpretations are, next, closely linked with accounts that refer to 
the smarter and more effective design of the (Austrian) political campaign and 
propaganda so as to also yield tales about heroic efforts by local activists and 
elites (cf., among many others, Wutte 1922, 1943; Deuer et al. 2019).  
It is indeed remarkable that the Carinthian plebiscite has been prominent in 
local political and remembrance culture and some publications, predominantly 
on diplomatic affairs, but very little scientific effort has been invested to un-
cover more specific calculus and motives of the voters (Moritsch 1981, 215). 
But if we adopt a wider perspective and consider that vote choice may also be 
thoroughly affected by other cultural motives and values and by very pragmatic 
assumptions concerning individual life chances and well-being, there is effec-
tively a catalogue of alternative motives. Besides ethno-nationalist appeals, a 
number of reasons may have motivated the voters to select Austria: 
1) For liberals, leftists, and organized workers, Austria, governed by a so-
cial-democratic chancellor and, then, a focal point of socialist aspirations 
in Europe, may have offered a more attractive perspective than being 
turned into subjects of a militarized kingdom. Unlike Austria, Yugoslavia 
still ran military campaigns and had compulsory conscription in the ar-
my, which likely caused existential threats to small-scale family farming. 
2) Likewise, the Austrian state was organized as a federal union, while the 
Yugoslavian kingdom was heavily centralized and dominated by (great-
er) Serbian interests. Therefore the option for Austria most likely guaran-
teed broader and deeper perspectives for local self-government. 
3) The Austrian propaganda was more effective and certainly better tailored 
to the specific interests of its recipients. The campaign predominantly ad-
dressed the Slovenian majority in Zone I. It almost entirely skipped the 
usual Greater-Germany ideology and rhetorics, but instead emphasized 
the traits of a common heritage of the German and the Slovene groups 
and appealed to the idea of Carinthian unity. Perhaps the most effective 
arguments concerned the economic benefits and the preservation of eco-
nomic exchange relations within Carinthia (cf. Deuer et al. 2019; Wutte 
1943, 331-45).  
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4) The Austrian social-democrats, at that time a well-organized party and 
very capable to influence and sway likely voters, issued an unequivocal 
recommendation to cast a vote in favor of Austria. Provided that the pre-
dominantly rural Carinthian region tended to have sizable segments of 
voters who leaned towards the social-democrats, the preferences of this 
political camp have been considered crucial by both German and Slove-
nian historians (cf. Moritsch 1981; Pleterski 2002; Valentin 2002). 
5) Apparently, many voters, Germans and Slovenians, were rather occupied 
with the unity of historical Carinthia than with the selection of either op-
tion. This was substantiated both by long-standing cultural, historical, 
and political ideas and traditions. While the outcome of the referendum in 
Zone I was in doubt and likely decided by a narrow margin, it was ex-
pected that Zone II, where only about eight percent of the population 
used Slovenian as a first language, would overwhelmingly vote for Aus-
tria. Choosing Austria was therefore the safest bet to ensure the unity of 
the state. But the deep economic integration of the Klagenfurt Basin was 
also a key aspect: due to the division of the Zones I and II by a line of 
demarcation, established economic exchange routes had been blocked 
and guarded by Yugoslavian police and military forces in 1919/ 20. Local 
peasants, who depended upon the access to the markets of Klagenfurt 
and/ or some other towns, thus learned about the economic fallout of be-
ing shut out from well-established economic exchange channels. 
6) The literature on the socioeconomic underpinnings of the Carinthian 
plebiscite is characterized by divergent assessments: some publications 
suggest that across the board economic prospects were more favorable in 
Austria than in Yugoslavia and cite the higher standard of living or the 
provision of an encompassing system of social protection, etc. In con-
trast, Moritsch (1981) adopts a more differentiated perspective and force-
fully argues that the German-Austrian rump state was probably the more 
attractive option for farmers who were eager to sell their products. The 
shrunken Austrian state did have problems to properly feed its citizens 
after World War I, and the high demand for agricultural products resulted 
in comparatively high prices. Selecting Austria meant to ensuring busi-
ness opportunities and to fostering economic well-being. In this vein, the 
local peasant population may have been moved by economic opportun-
ism rather than by a national awakening. 
7) Authors from the German-nationalist tradition have emphasized the op-
pressive nature of the Yugoslavian occupation and extensively reported 
on severe restrictions of political and public life, unfounded punishments 
of civilians, and the banishment and expulsion of critical voices and op-
position members. These arbitrary assaults, so the argument states, had 
demonstrated the true nature of the Yugoslavian regime and had alienated 
many likely supporters (cf. Fräss-Ehrfeld 2010, 170-6, many passages in 
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Wutte 1922 and Wutte 1943, but also Suppan 1994, 603-6 and Suppan 
2002). 
8) We conclude this brief account with a final argument that does not posit 
straightforward causal effects, but rather refers to empirical regularities. 
Referenda on territorial issues are apparently characterized by some con-
servative bias. Strongly dependent on the successful framing of the issue 
by one side or the other, a majority of voters in a number of contests ap-
peared to favor the state they are in and are not overly eager to switch 
their affiliations. For the Carinthian plebiscite, the Austro-German propa-
ganda successfully created the image that voting for Austria implied to 
stay, while the choice for Yugoslavia meant to go (Deuer et al. 2019). 
But there are also manifold motives to choose Yugoslavia: 
1) Secession attempts did not begin during the border conflict and the refer-
endum, but instead started in the 18th century and were reinforced during 
World War I. These tendencies were also fueled by an intense pressure to 
assimilate minority groups in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
2) The Yugoslavian political propaganda likely adopted an ill-designed an-
gle by predominantly centering on ethno-nationalist arguments and, in 
terms of negative campaigning, persistently characterizing the German-
Austrian rump state as a domain of prostitutes, jews, and losers. Yet, 
propaganda efforts by the Catholic Church were certainly more effective. 
3) As laid out above, Moritsch (1981) adopts a differentiated perspective 
which posits that different occupational groups may differ in their as-
sessments of economic prospects offered by either option. In this view, 
the economic considerations that drove peasants to vote for the Austrian 
marketplace also had a reverse. The future of industrial workers in Aus-
tria was allegedly unpredictable, and unemployment rates were substan-
tial. Concomitantly, the Yugoslavian kingdom largely lacked an industri-
al infrastructure so that many commercial products were more 
marketable, and business opportunities for entrepreneurs and industrial 
workers may have appeared more favorable than in neighboring Austria 
(Moritsch 1981, 2002). 
4) Another group of socioeconomic arguments invoked and addressed the 
fear of socialism. For the contemporary standards social protection in 
Austria was encompassing and generous, but, depending on specific ideo-
logical angles, this was also framed as the advance of socialism. Predom-
inantly conservative entrepreneurs or other affluent strata of the society 
not only focused in economic opportunities with the much larger Yugo-
slavian state, but were also afraid about perspectives of and rumors about 
a socialism in Austria, and many of them were even afraid of potential 
disappropriation measures by a socialist Austrian government. 
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5) Ultimately, allegations about atrocities, erratic, unlawful rule, and expul-
sions are not restricted to actions by the Yugoslavian side, but have also 
been directed at Austrian military and Carinthian militias. Notably within 
the predominantly Slovenian settlements, rape, looting, and pillages were 
so often widely-used instruments of warfare that prominent Austrian ac-
tors started worrying about the fallout and the impact of these atrocities 
upon the outcome of the referendum (Haas and Stuhlpfarrer 1977, 31-8). 
4.  Data and Data Limitations 
This section advances from political and historical background towards the 
presentation and discussion of the empirical data at hand. Our contribution is 
able to focus on detailed aggregate election returns from the Carinthian plebi-
scite in 1920 which have been gathered for the 51 administrative/ electoral 
communities which comprise Zone I. Unfortunately, the key explanatory varia-
ble applied in the historiographic literature and adopted in this analysis, the 
alleged ethnic composition of these territories, could not be measured and 
matched simultaneously and is most likely affected by systematic measurement 
bias. Turning towards the additional contextual controls, some key features of 
local communities have been derived from official statistics. We briefly com-
ment on each of these dependent and independent variables, in turn. 
4.1  Results of the Carinthian Plebiscite 
The formal referendum was organized and overseen by an allied commission, 
and the voting and counting procedures followed a formalized, thick rulebook 
(cf. Wutte 1943, 358-79; Wadl 2019, 169-75). The literature quotes a number 
of alleged irregularities that have alternatively been blamed upon Austrian, 
Yugoslavian, or partisan allied actors (cf. the accounts by Wutte 1922: Plet-
erski 1970; Wadl 2019). However during the referendum on 10 October 1920, 
electoral integrity appears to have been preserved, voting was by and large 
unobstructed, and generally followed the established rules of the game. In 
addition, the electoral process was monitored by an inter-allied referendum 
commission that did not command military units, but was able to field more 
than 50 election observers. The final vote count was conducted by allied per-
sonnel and both Austrian and Yugoslavian representatives were only able to 
oversee and watch the counting process from the sidelines (cf. the detailed but 
biased narrative by Wutte 1943, 358-400). 
While the entire Zone I formed a unified electoral district and the matter was 
to be decided by simple majority at this level, voting was organized in 97 elec-
toral precincts, and the official tally of the vote has been broken down to four 
administrative districts and 51 distinct electoral communities. For each of these 
HSR 45 (2020) 4  │  320 
territorial units, we know the number of eligible citizens and the count of voters 
who selected either Austria and Yugoslavia (cf. the summaries printed in Wutte 
1922, 194-5; reprinted in Wutte 1943, 471-2 and Wadl 2019, 178-9). Note, 
however, that not all of the parishes exactly correspond to the official commu-
nities and their borders, since the line of demarcation, which separates the 
referendum zone I and II, also divided some established administrative com-
munities. (Appendix A presents data at the level of the 51 local communities, 
adds some extensions, and comments on some factual errors in this data.) 
4.2  Counting “Germans,“ Discounting “Slovenes“? 
The inconsistencies mentioned above effectively complicate the matching of 
official electoral returns from the Carinthian plebiscite, and the census data 
comes with a number of problems and biases per se. In all territories of Austro-
Hungarian Empire or the Dual Monarchy, a public census was to be conducted 
every ten years. The pandemonic events in the aftermath of World War I, dur-
ing the extended period of the Austrian-Yugoslavian border conflicts, did not 
allow for conducting the formal census which was scheduled for 1920. This 
especially applies to Zone I which was provisionally governed by Yugoslavian 
authorities and temporarily sealed off from the other territories. Therefore, 
detailed data on the ethnic composition of individual communities may only be 
taken from the previous census conducted in 1910. The ten-year gap in the data 
used as a dependent (i.e., the aggregate referendum results) and the key inde-
pendent variables (i.e., results of the census concerning the ethnic composition 
of the 51 communities and some additional controls) is certainly noteworthy: 
the census registers the overall population including minors, foreigners, etc. 
These figures will always exceed the count of eligible and enrolled voters, but 
there are also good reasons to assume that both will generally be proportional.  
Demographic changes certainly affected the terrains of South-East Carinthia 
in the decade from 1910 to 1920, and at least parts of the male population will 
have fought and/ or died in World War I. However, both Austrian and Sloveni-
an historians agree that, provided that the Carinthian territories in Zone I were 
not exposed to abrupt changes in the agrarian and general socioeconomic struc-
tures and not directly affected by hostile action in World War I, the decade 
from 1910 to 1920 was, in contrast to the subsequent 1920s, not at all charac-
terized by significant demographic upheaval in the disputed terrains (Moritsch 
1981, 217). Therefore, we follow the vast majority of previous work and pre-
sume that, in spite of the time gap, the 1910 census may still be applied as a 
valuable proxy for the ethno-linguistic context during the referendum ten years 
later (cf. Wutte 1922, 1943; Pleterski 1970, 2002; Pleterski and Druškovic 
1983; Moritsch 1981, 2002; Wadl 2019).  
We have mentioned above that some of the territorial units used to organize 
the referendum do not exactly match with administrative community borders. 
For instance, the Eastern part of the administrative community Finkenstein/ 
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Bekštanj was merged with the administrative community of Latschach/ Loče , 
and parts of the administrative communities Kienberg, Lavamünd/ Labot, and 
Legerbuch were fused into the newly established electoral community of La-
vamünd/ Labot. However, these issues were confined to some communities 
which were proximate to the demarcation line that inclosed Zones I and II or 
close to some newly established borders that now separated the Carinthian, 
Italian, and Yugoslavian territories. Below the line and provided that detailed 
and high-quality census data was also gathered for subunits of administrative 
communities (German, “Kastralgemeinden”), these temporal gaps and incon-
sistencies may be satisfactorily addressed and corrected by some reasonable 
assumptions. 
Given the methodological options and restrictions of the time, the Austro-
Hungarian census provides detailed and high quality data. But much more 
crucial problems emanate from biased and prejudiced measurement of individ-
ual ethno-linguistic affiliation with the German or the Slovenian group. There-
fore, estimates and figures discussed in public and scientific debates are likely 
affected by systematic measurement bias. In principle, separating Germans and 
Slovenes is ostensibly easily and uni-dimensionally operationalized by the self-
reported conversational language (German, “Umgangssprache”). 
The first issue is that minority citizens in larger communities have been put 
under much more intense pressure to assimilate and switch to speaking Ger-
man. Small-scale farmers working in a subsistence economy likely had little 
exchange with customers who were located further away and came from differ-
ent villages or ethnic groups. Yet, those who ran larger estates which produced 
marketable surpluses needed to look out for practical market places, and access 
to these more profitable outlets likely required assimilating in terms of, at least 
in business affairs, switching to the dominant German language. While local 
demographics did not change much from 1880 to 1910, the share of those who 
indicated Slovenian as their conversational language remained stable in remote, 
rural areas and small villages, but declined constantly and rapidly in more 
densely populated areas and larger communities. Industrial workers and the 
few Slovenes who had risen to the higher strata of society (or planned to do so) 
were likely under even more intense pressure to assimilate (cf. Moritsch 1981, 
223-6; Wendel 1920, 576-7). In ethnic and/ or linguistically mixed communi-
ties, any measure of a conversational language will usually and systematically 
be biased in favor of either the language of the majority group or the more 
empowered group (Brix 1981, 236-7). 
The dichotomous choice to indicate one, and the restriction to name only 
one, conversational language was certainly at odds with empirical bi- or multi-
lingualism in Carinthia and many other parts of Austria-Hungary. This dichot-
omous alternative reveals the census to rather be an instrument of ethno-
nationalist assimilation and domination efforts than of sober and unbiased 
bureaucratic and/ or political planning. Additional systematic measurement 
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bias was introduced by census interviewers who were eager to under-represent 
minority groups, but instead to underscore the German character of their local 
communities and to fabricate evidence for successful assimilation efforts led by 
their administration (cf. the numerous examples from Carinthia and other parts 
of Austria-Hungary gathered by Brix 1981, 234-9).  
Note that this contribution to positive political science will sidestep any es-
sentialist discussion about the true contents or even nature of being “German” 
or “Slovene.” Effectively, the detailed and rich records compiled by the Aus-
tro-Hungarian census from 1880 to 1910 are without any feasible measurement 
alternative and have been concurrently and persistently utilized by the “Ger-
man,” the “Slovenian,” and the “Viennese” camps in an often polarized debate. 
Throughout this paper, we thus define group membership only and strictly by 
self-ascribed conversational language as recorded in the census. We do, how-
ever, hasten to add that data on local ethnic affiliation and ethnic shares of the 
population gathered by the Austro-Hungarian census is affected by systematic 
measurement error, likely biased downwards for the number and share of Slo-
vene-speaking citizens, and beclouds meaningful comparisons among rural and 
urban areas or peasants’ and industrial workers’ political interests and prefer-
ences. We thus hasten to record that the estimates for the Slovenianspeaking 
shares of the local populations provide a lower bound rather than an unbiased 
point estimator. 
5.  Historiographic Myth and Empirical Reality 
Almost by nature, nationalist angles, be it in politics, public discourse, or in 
(distorted) contributions to science, do not tend to adopt multi-faceted perspec-
tives. Instead, these statements often select a narrow, uni-dimensional perspec-
tive and refrain from both meaningful and transparent definitions of key terms, 
from systematic data collection and documentation, and from methodical, 
thorough data analysis. Concerning the Carinthian plebiscite, nationalist histor-
ical accounts provided by the German and also by the Slovenian camps explic-
itly or, at least, implicitly assume the dichotomous choice for Austria or for 
Yugoslavia were informed exclusively, if not solely, by ethnic or linguistic 
cleavages. In the subsequent discussion, we can only provide some brief sketch 
of these accounts: 
1) The German-nationalist camp in Carinthian historiography cogently re-
lies on and persistently defends the obsolete publications by Wutte (1922 
and 1943). While the author provides detailed and mostly correct data on 
the 1910 census and vote choice in the 1920 referendum, he does not ful-
ly interpret this material and implicitly assumes that all German and an 
additional 10,000 Slovenian voters chose to become members of the new 
Austrian republic. Later, these numbers are, with or without references, 
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regularly copied by other authors who relate to this tradition (cf. Wadl 
2002, 167; Webernig 2019, 57). 
2) Within this tradition, only the piece by Wadl (2019, 180-1) bothered to 
take a somewhat closer look at the community-level electoral returns re-
ported by Wutte (1922, 180; 1943, 398). This somewhat more fine-
grained inspection of some local electoral returns, for instance from Fer-
lach/ Borovlje, revealed that at least 500 German voters apparently se-
lected Yugoslavia, and these findings vice versa implied an upward cor-
rection towards 11,000 Slovenian votes for Yugoslavia. These numbers 
have also been copied by Fräss-Ehrfeld (2010, 193). 
3) Strikingly, key authors in Slovenian historiography at least implicitly 
adopt very similar ethno-nationalist viewpoints, underscore the para-
mount importance of ethnic or linguistic cleavages and adopt identical 
accounts of 10,000 (roughly 40%) ethnic and/ or linguistic Slovenes that 
casted a vote for Austria (cf. Valentin 2011, 18). The calculations by 
Pleterski (1970, 84-5) unambiguously assumes that Germans vote for 
Austria, while Slovenes prefer Yugoslavia and suggest that the pseudo-
exact number of 10,527 Slovenes or 40.80% cast a vote for Austria. In 
another publication, Pleterski and Druškovicˇ (1983, 5) reiterate similar 
numbers and explicitly state that certainly all (!) German-speaking voters 
had supported Austria. 
4) The guesses presented by the “Viennese” camp of historians are regularly 
somewhat higher, but are usually also not underpinned by any empirical 
evidence or reference. Some publications adopt numbers from the Ger-
man-nationalist mainstream and posit that roughly 10,000 Slovenes had 
voted for Yugoslavia. Suppan (2002, 108) believes that about 11,000 
Slovenes supported Austria; Haas and Stuhlpfarrer (1977, 49) rather 
speculate that about 12,000 ethnic “Slovenes” (however defined) voted 
“German” (whatever that may be). Moritsch (1981, 215) draws upon the 
literature and reports a wide interval ranging from 10,000 up to 15,000 
linguistic Slovenes that selected Austria. Yet, his references back up the 
lower bound of 10,000 with empirical evidence (cf. Wutte 1943, 398), 
while the upper bound of 15,000 may only be derived from a simple nu-
merical example in an opinonated article by Wendel (1920, 577). 
The pivotal goal of this contribution is to replace these wild guesses and un-
founded speculations by descriptive inferences that exhaust the information 
available at the community level. In the remainder of this descriptive section, 
we seek to provide a first glance at the electoral and demographic data gathered 
for an empirical re-assessment of the 1920 Carinthian plebiscite. Key data on 
electoral returns and demographics has been recounted above: in the aggregate, 
59.04 percent of the enfranchised citizens opted to join Austria, while only 
31.40 percent of them were linguistic Germans. At the community level, 33 
voted for Austria and only 18 favored Yugoslavia. North of the river Drau/ 
HSR 45 (2020) 4  │  324 
Dráva, Austria won 20 of 24 local communities, south of it, it managed to pick 
up only 13 of 27 (cf. Appendix A for a breakdown of the results into four elec-
toral districts and 51 communities).  
Figure 3: Vote Choice and Demographics in the Carinthian Plebiscite 
 
Notes: This simple illustration ignores the ecological inference problem and plots the aggre-
gate share of Germans against the aggregate votes cast for Austria at the community level. 
The numbers label the local communities (cf. Table 3 in Appendix A), and the size of the labels 
is parallel to the number of citizens in a community. The dashed line indicates identity, i.e., for 
observations to the upper-left the share of votes for Austria exceeds the share of “Germans,” 
and to the lower-right the share of votes for Austria falls behind the share of ethnic “Ger-
mans.” We have also added a LOESS smoother to indicate non-linear associations. 
 
Figure 3 provides a comparison of electoral returns from the referendum (here, 
the share of votes cast for Austria: y-axis), and measures for the ethnic compo-
sition of local communities (here, the share of German-speaking voters: x-
axis). The case labels indicate a running number of the communities (cf. Ap-
pendix A), and the size of these labels represents the population density within 
these diverse and heterogeneous regions. Finally, note that the diagonal line 
ranging from the lower left to the upper right indicates identity: if any commu-
nity is situated directly upon this line, the choice between Austria and Yugo-
slavia appears to systematically reflect its ethnic composition. Locations above 
the diagonal indicate that the vote share for Austria exceeds the assumed share 
of linguistic Germans as proxied by the 1910 census. Of course, this must be 
true for a number of communities so as to account for the aggregate majority 
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for Austria in Zone I. Some explicit examples are the (smaller) villages Mieger/ 
Medgorje (15), Gallizien/ Galicija (30), or Tainach/ Tinje (49). Vice versa, 
when local community is situated below the diagonal, the vote share for Aus-
tria undercuts the share of linguistic Germans. This applies to eight communi-
ties, for instance to Ferlach/ Borovlje (9), and also in the comparatively indus-
trialized communities of Viktring/ Vetrinj (22), Bleiburg/ Pliberk (26), or 
Eisenkappel/ Železna Kapla (28).  
In a nutshell, this simple graphical presentation illustrates that the ethnic 
dimension certainly mattered for vote choice in the Carinthian plebiscite. How-
ever, these alleged cleavages are often superimposed by other potential deter-
minants of the vote, e.g., rural vs. industrial interests, the proximity to borders, 
or other aspects of (economic) geography. In this vein, vote choice in the refer-
endum does not appear to be a mere reflex of some demographic element. 
Rather, electoral behavior appears to be structured by complex interactions of 
ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity, with contextual variables. 
6.  Ecological Inference as a Way Forward 
The ecological fallacy has been a key problem in social sciences and applied 
statistics. This error arises when observers naively rely on aggregate or group 
characteristics, but attempt to draw causal or descriptive inferences at the indi-
vidual level. The key logical and statistical problem is how to deal with aggre-
gation bias, i.e., how to address the information loss that occurs when individu-
al actions, preferences, or properties are aggregated and only reported at a 
higher level (cf. the seminal contributions by Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Robin-
son 1950 and the historical survey by King 1997, 3-12).  
In the modern quantitative toolbox, ecological inference is a common label 
for an array of techniques and perspectives that intends to provide a way for-
ward and enable researchers, in spite of aggregation bias and a number of relat-
ed complications, to draw some meaningful inferences based on aggregate data. 
Ecological inferences are required when individual level data is not available. 
This is true, for instance, when researchers dig into historical cases which oc-
curred before the widespread availability of (high-quality) survey data. A 
common application refers to the social and ideological underpinnings of the 
Nazi vote in Weimar Germany, when survey data is not available, but a way 
forward could be found by relying on complete, community- or district-level 
election returns and detailed socio-demographic data for the same units (cf. 
Falter 1991). Ecological inference techniques are also required when survey 
data is available, but notoriously unreliable in ethnically or racially polarized 
conflicts. Therefore, in American politics, many details of the U.S. Voting 
Rights Act require alternative conceptual angles. Studies on race and literacy, 
race and voter registration, race and vote choice have therefore become ubiqui-
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tous in this subfield (cf. almost countless examples in Achen and Shivley 1995; 
King 1997; King, Tanner, and Rosen 2004; Wakefield 2004; Imai, Lu, and 
Strauss 2007).  
Essentially, the Carinthian plebiscite is almost an ideal and textbook case of 
an ecological inference. At the level of 51 electoral communities, we are able 
to draw upon detailed electoral returns of the 1920 referendum, and, as long as 
we are willing to accept the validity of the 1910 census, we have data on the 
relative shares of ethno-linguistic groups within the same units. This data ena-
bles us to construct a simple 2x2 table of the ecological inference problem at 
hand, which we formally present in Table 1. We only know the marginal distri-
butions of linguistic self-identification in 1910 and vote choice in the referen-
dum in 1920: In the rows, Yi = 59.04% of the voters (i.e., 22,025 individuals) 
selected Austria, while the remaining 100 − 𝑌 = 40.96% (i.e., 15,279 voters) 
opted for Yugoslavia. Turning towards the columns of Table 1, we also know 
that only 𝑋 = 31.4% of the population indicated German as their conversa-
tional language, while the other 100 − 𝑋 = 68.6% allegedly indicated to 
conduct everyday conversations in Slovenian.  
Table 1: Known and Unknown Variables in the Carinthian Plebiscite/ the 
Ecological Inference Problem 
  ethno-linguistic group  
  German Slovenian  
vote Austria Wi,1 Wi,2 Yi
choice Yugoslavia 1-Wi,1 1-Wi,2 1-Yi
  Xi 1-Xi
Notes: A 2x2 ecological inference table representing vote choice (rows) and linguistic group 
affiliation (columns) in the Carinthian plebiscite. Xi and Yi are known proportions for each 
community i; Wi,1 and Wi,2 are unknown proportions which we explore in ecological inference. 
Note that the notation used throughout this paper has been adopted from Imai, Lu, and 
Strauss (2007, 2011). 
 
Table 1 may be set-up to the entire referendum zone, but, as indicated above, 
we have obtained sufficient local data to construct parallel tables for each indi-
vidual electoral community i = 1,…, 51. While the marginals (the shares of the 
two linguistic groups, and the votes received for the Austrian and the Yugosla-
vian option, i.e., Xi and Yi) are known, the key goal of any ecological inference 
model or technique is to obtain reliable estimates for the unknown parameters 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , . Substantively, 𝑊 ,  is the share of linguistic Germans that select 
Austria, and 𝑊 ,  is the share of linguistic Slovenes that choose Austria. Once 
these quantities are known, of course 1 − 𝑊 ,  and 1 − 𝑊 ,  are also fixed for 
each local community i.  
In logical and statistical analyses, a number of alternative or complimentary 
methods have been suggested to fill in the unknown quantities of interest. The 
logical “methods of bounds” may be used to uncover deterministic, but most 
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often very wide boundaries that are guaranteed to cover 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , . Paramet-
ric models, ecological regression, often labeled “Goodman’s regression,” pro-
vide alternative statistical attempts to identify 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , . Eventually, the 
seminal contribution by King (1997) integrated these two previously alternative 
and isolated approaches into a common statistical framework, derived appro-
priate estimation techniques and thoroughly tested the novel framework with an 
extensive set of empirical applications. 
6.1  Logical Bounds 
Duncan and Davis (1953) were the first to provide a logical approach to the 
ecological inference problem. Their model requires no specific statistical as-
sumptions and provides deterministic, but wide bounds for the quantities of 
interest. Consider, for instance, the town of Ferlach/ Borovlje: from the elec-
toral returns we know that among N = 1, 703 valid votes, 72.5 percent voted for 
Austria and the remaining 27.5 percent opted for Yugoslavia; from the 1910 
census we also learn that 89.8 percent spoke German and only 10.2 percent 
spoke Slovenian in everyday conversation. Unfortunately, these marginals do 
not tell us very much about the electoral behavior of the local Slovenian minor-
ity, and the share of them voting for Austria may lie anywhere from zero to one 
hundred percent (𝑊 ,  ∈  [0, 1]). However, for Ferlach/ Borovlje we know 
somewhat more about vote choice among the German-speaking majority. Since 
the vote share for Austria significantly falls behind the share of ethnic Ger-
mans, a notable portion must have cast a vote for Yugoslavia. The method of 
bounds thus reveals that the share of German-speakers who selected Austria 
must lie in the interval from 69.4 to 80.8 percent (𝑊 ,  ∈ [0.694, 0.808]). The 
true value of 𝑊 ,  will be at its lower limit when all Slovenians cast a vote for 
Austria (i.e., 𝑊 , = 1), it will be at the upper limit when none of them do (𝑊 , = 
0).  
More generally, links of the marginals (Xi and Yi) with the quantities of in-
terest (𝑊 , and 𝑊 , ) are formalized by a simple algebraic equation. Note that 
this expression lacks an error term and thus provides deterministic bounds: 𝑌 =  𝑊 , 𝑋 + 𝑊 , (1 − 𝑋 ); ∀i = 1,2, … , n; with 𝑌 , 𝑋 , 𝑊 , , 𝑊 , ∈ [0, 1] 
As demonstrated by King (1997, 301–3), deterministic Duncan/ Davis bounds 
for the vote shares 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 ,  may be easily derived by the following equa-
tions:  𝑊 , ∈ max 0, 𝑋 + 𝑌 − 1𝑋 , min 1, 𝑌𝑋  𝑊 , ∈ max 0, 𝑌 − 𝑋1 − 𝑋 , min 1, 𝑌1 − 𝑋  
 
By definition, these equations imply that we have complete knowledge about 
the four cells in Table 1 (𝑊 , , 𝑊 , , 1 − 𝑊 , , 1 − 𝑊 , ) once we observe any 
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single one. Solving the above equation for Wi,1, therefore yields a linear rela-
tion among the shares of the German (𝑊 , ) and the Slovene language groups 
(𝑊 , ) that support Austria. Note that the first fraction term (in parenthesis) 
represents the intercept of the linear association, while the second term (also in 
parentheses) captures its (negative) slope of the linear association: 𝑊 , =  𝑌1 − 𝑋 − 𝑋1 − 𝑋 𝑊 ,  
The above equation provides sufficient information so as to construct a “to-
mography plot” of the ecological inference problem that covers all of the 51 
local communities in Zone I. Each line in Figure 4 has been calculated from the 
local marginals for each of the 51 communities at hand and represents potential 
associations of 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , . In any case, both values are related by a simple 
linear equation, and the true values are guaranteed to fall somewhere on the 
specific lines. To see this more clearly, we have used a thicker blue line to 
represent the previously discussed example of Ferlach/ Borovlje: the range of 
the Slovenian vote for Austria, on the y-axis, is as wide as possible and only 
limited by the margins of the scale (0 ≤ W , ≤ 1). However, the German vote 
for Austria, on the x-axis, is restricted to a much more narrow interval which 
only covers a small part of the overall scale range (0.694 < 𝑊 ,  < 0.808).  
Generally, steep lines, which run parallel to the y-axis, as in the case of Fer-
lach/ Borovlje, tell us a lot about the German voter segment, but little about the 
Slovenian one. Vice versa, flat lines, which run parallel to the x-axis, enable us 
to define narrow, informative bounds for the Slovenian vote, but wide, non-
informative bounds for the German vote. Short diagonals at the bottom-left or 
top-right of the figure are most informative and provide narrow bounds for each 
of the vote shares 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , . Eventually, (almost) exact diagonals ranging 
from top-left to bottom-right tell us nothing (or very little) about a specific 
community. Instead of searching for the true values of 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 ,  some-
where within the entire unit square, we now know that the true values are much 
more restricted and fall somewhere on the respective tomography line for any 
local community i.  
The practical value of Duncan/ Davis bounds depends on the specifics of the 
data and distributions at hand. Applied to the Carinthian plebiscite, these logi-
cal restrictions on the parameter space provide rich and useful information. 
Particularly, both the ethno-linguistic composition and the electoral returns 
vary considerably from one community to the other. In addition, both variables 
quite often approach the scale margins when these areas are either character-
ized by a lopsided composition of the German or Slovenian linguistic group or 
local referendum returns overwhelmingly favor either the Austrian or the Yu-
goslavian vote. Even a brief inspection of Figure 4 clearly reveals that most 
community-level tomography lines at least substantively restrict the vote shares 
for one of the groups thereby providing information for the other group, as 
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well. The deterministic Duncan/ Davis bounds therefore supply necessary 
information for a successful application of the ecological inference framework.  
Figure 4: Duncan/ Davis Bounds in a Tomography Plot 
 
Notes: Each of these lines represents one of the 51 local communities of Zone I. The dataset is 
presented and summarized in Appendix A. Intercepts and the downward slopes may be exactly 
calculated from the marginals, and Wi,1 and Wi,2 are guaranteed to lie somewhere on these 
lines. For illustrative purposes, the community of Ferlach/ Borovlje, discussed above, is high-
lighted by the thick blue thicker line. 
 
Eventually, logical bounds calculated for each of the 51 local communities may 
also be aggregated so as to obtain deterministic bounds on 𝑊  and 𝑊  for the 
entire referendum zone. However, if we run these computations, we also see 
that the Duncan/ Davis bounds are still too wide to allow for any substantively 
meaningful interpretation. If we are inclined to accept the validity of the refer-
endum returns and the 1910 census, which is certainly more doubtful, at least 
49.42% and a maximum of 95.87% of the Germans voted for Austria (𝑊  ∈ 
[0.4942, 0.9587]). Bounds for the share of Slovenian voters that also supported 
the Austrian option are more narrowly defined and vary between 41.82% and 
63.53% (𝑊  ∈ [0.4182, 0.6353]). Therefore, the choice for Austria was only 
possible due to the support of 10,628 to 16,146 Slovenian voters. But, as indi-
cated above, there are also good reasons not to trust the data gathered by the 
Austro-Hungarian census. When the number and share of linguistic Slovenians 
is systematically depressed, the above intervals are biased downwardly and 
provide lower bounds rather than a realistic assessment. 
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6.2  Employing Non-Parametric Statistical Models 
Imai, Lu, and Strauss (2007, 2011) show that ecological inference is essentially 
a coarse data problem: this label applies when key quantities of interest are 
neither entirely missing nor fully observed. For the referendum dataset, 
knowledge of the marginal distributions enables us to calculate Duncan/ Davis 
bounds, but we do not directly observe the key quantities of interest 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , . Building upon the coarse data framework by Heitjan and Rubin (1991), 
ecological inference may be decomposed into three distinct subissues: 
1) Contextual effects occur when 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 ,  are correlated with observed 
or unobserved contextual variables; 
2) distributional effects arise when parametric models are mis-specified and 
do not capture the true underlying distribution of the coarsened variables; 
3) aggregation problems due to the loss of information by focusing exclu-
sively on higher-level entities. 
Common parametric models, including the seminal specifications by King 
(1997) and Wakefield (2004), usually assume the data to be CAR (coarsened at 
random). Therefore, 𝑊  ∗ = [logit(𝑊 , ), logit(𝑊 , )] is defined by 𝑊  ∗ |µ, Σ . . .∼  𝒩 (µ, Σ) 
Note that µ is a 2x1 vector of population means and Σa 2x2 positive definitive 
variance matrix. This simplistic specification also rests on the idea that there 
are no measured or unmeasured contextual effects which impact on 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , , and this assumption is usually quite unrealistic. Concerning the empirical 
application in this paper, the Carinthian plebiscite, we have briefly scrolled 
through a whole catalogue of alternative explanations, cultural links, economic 
self-interest, ideological or political convictions, which may either concomi-
tantly or adversely affect both ethno-linguistic groups. It is thus pivotal for our 
analysis to relax assumptions of no contextual effect, and Imai, Lu, and Strauss 
(2007) suggest two alternative perspectives. The first is to collect additional 
covariates 𝑍  and to treat the data as CCAR (conditionally coarsened at ran-
dom). The second is a NCAR (not coarsened at random) model that attempts to 
capture contextual effects directly without additional observed covariates 𝑍 . 
In order to address the second issue, likely distributional effects, Imai, Lu, 
and Strauss (2007, 48-50) recommend to switch to more flexible and general 
Bayesian non-parametric models that are based on Dirichlet process priors. 
With the term “non-parametric,” we imply that no à priori distributional as-
sumptions are made and that in-sample predictions comply with the Duncan/ 
Davis bounds defined above: 
 𝑊 ∗  |µ , Σ ∼ 𝒩(µ , Σ ), µ , Σ | G ∼ G 𝐺|α ∼ 𝒟(G , α), α ∼ G(𝑎 , 𝑏 ).  
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µ |Σ ∼ 𝒩 µ , ; 𝛴 ∼ InvWish (𝜐 , 𝑆 ).  
7.  Turning Prejudiced Guesses into Unbiased Inference 
The joint consideration of Duncan/ Davis bounds and some key elements of 
ecological regression enables us to now turn towards the key goal of this paper, 
i.e., to obtain meaningful and precise estimates for the shares of ethnic German 
or Slovenian citizens that voted for Austria (𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , , respectively) both in 
each of the 51 communities and across the entire Zone I.  
We apply Bayesian non-parametric models that relax the assumption of no 
correlation/ no contextual effects so as to obtain unbiased and precise posteri-
ors for 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , . These models are fit via MCMC simulation and the Gibbs 
sampler as implemented in the “eco” package (Imai, Lu, and Strauss 2011; Lu 
2017). Technically, we set diffuse priors, run a total of 300,000 iterations per 
chain, but discard the first 100,000 draws as a burn-in period, and only evaluate 
every 200th iteration (i.e., we employ a thinning interval of 200). We also run 
multiple chains in order to check for proper mixing and overlap and compute a 
battery of statistical tests for convergence of the MCMC process. Construction 
and simulation of the Bayesian models at hand pass all conventional tests that 
guard against autocorrelation within chains, non-stationarity of chains, and 
mismatch across different chains with overdispersed starting values (cf. key 
model diagnostics in Appendix B). 
Table 2: Filling In the Blanks 
  ethno-linguistic group  
  German Slovenian  








choice Yugoslavia 1 − 𝑊 = 
(13.61%);23.91%; 
(35.19%) 





  31.4%; 11,713 68.6%; 25,591  
Notes: The Table fills in the gaps and summarizes Bayesian posterior distributions for the entire 
referendum Zone I. The bold numbers represent the posterior means for the share of German-
language voters that opted for Austria (W1) and for Slovene-language voters that chose Yugo-
slavia. The numbers in brackets indicate the 95% Bayesian HPD intervals. 
 
With these methodological foundations in mind, we now turn to the key sub-
stantive findings of our study. Table 2 presents summaries of the posterior 
densities for the key quantities of interest, the overall counts/ shares of German 
and of Slovenian voters that cast votes for Austria or for Yugoslavia. The re-
sults clearly indicate that previous guesses have severely misjudged and dis-
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torted the impact and salience of ethno-linguistic cleavages for vote choice in 
the Carinthian plebiscite. We find that more than half of the Slovenian voters 
opted to join Austria (the upper-right cell; 𝑊  = 51.06%), and the 95% highest 
probability density region (HPD) ranges from 46.25% to 56.33%. Converted to 
raw counts, this implies that more than 13,000 Slovenian voters selected Aus-
tria. Likewise, previous accounts have severely and persistently overrepresent-
ed the share and number of ethnic Germans who were ready to join the Ger-
man-Austrian rump state. Actually, only somewhat more than three quarters of 
them selected this option (the upper-left cell; W1 = 76.09%), while the other 
quarter chose to run with Yugoslavia. The 95% Bayesian HPD interval ranges 
from 64.81% up to 86.39%. 
Self-reported linguistic group membership clearly impacts on vote choice in 
the referendum. Linguistic Germans are more likely to vote for Austria than 
linguistic Slovenians and vice versa. However, the gulf between both groups is 
not nearly as deep as previously claimed, and the German and Slovenian 
groups merely differ by some 25 percentage points. Effectively, the raw num-
ber of voters who supported Austria was higher in the Slovenian than in the 
German camp. Below the line, these findings do emphasize the key role of 
German and Slovenian group identities. Yet, in contrast to the prejudice by 
parochial and nationalist accounts ethnic identity was far from being a deter-
ministic and mechanical predictor, and many other aspects probably co-
determined vote choice in the referendum. Finally, as indicated before, the 
Austro-Hungarian census was designed to underrepresent linguistic minority 
groups. Our estimates are therefore biased downwardly and only apply as lower 
limits. Unfortunately, we only know the direction, but not the overall magni-
tude of this bias.  
In the next step, we re-project the results from the common ecological infer-
ence model presented above towards the 51 electoral communities at hand, i.e., 
we derive in-sample predictions to substantiate or validate our results. Figure 5 
presents some key information on each of these local entities. The grey bars 
show deterministic Duncan/ Davis bounds. As discussed before, these ranges 
are not statistical measures, they do not rely on any distributional assumptions, 
and the true values of 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 ,  are, as long as we do not deal with meas-
urement bias or error, guaranteed to fall within these ranges. The blue bars 
identify the 95% Bayesian highest probability density (HPD) of our non-
parametric ecological inference model. These blue intervals thus cover 95% of 
the MCMC iterations after burn-in. 
Finally, the white dots denote the posterior means, i.e., our best and most 
likely estimates for the share of German-speaking voters 𝑊 ,  and Slovene-
speaking voters 𝑊 ,  that favor to joining the new Austrian republic.  
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Figure 5: Duncan/ Davis Bounds and In-Sample Predictions for 51 Local 
Communities in Referendum Zone I 
 
Notes: In the left-hand panel, 𝑊 ,  indicates the share of the German-speaking voters in each 
community i that cast a vote to join Austria, in the right-hand panel, 𝑊 ,  indicates the share 
of the Slovene-speaking voters in each community i that cast a vote to join Austria. The labels 
identify local communities; in brackets we note the share of linguistic Germans. The grey bars 
indicate deterministic Duncan/ Davis bounds; the blue bars show the 95% Bayesian HPD 
intervals; the points denote the posterior means of the local 𝑊 ,  or, respectively, 𝑊 , . 
 
The grey Duncan/ Davis bounds and the blue Bayesian HPD intervals illustrate 
that both logical bounds and the results from our Bayesian non-parametric 
models become more precise for ethnic groups which are in an explicit majori-
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ty position. In Figure 5 we have arranged the 51 communities in Zone I accord-
ing to their share of German-speaking inhabitants with lower shares at the top 
and higher shares at the bottom. Some simple inspection of both subpanels 
reveals that we obtain more precise inferences on the share of German-
speaking voters that support Austria 𝑊 ,  within predominantly German com-
munities, while we are in a better position to narrow down the intervals for 𝑊 ,  
in communities which are dominated by the Slovenian group (and vice versa).  
Below the line, we find that self-declared conversational languages, our 
proxy to distinguish “Germans” and “Slovenes,” certainly had an impact on 
vote choice in the Carinthian plebiscite: someone who indicates that they speak 
German is comparatively more likely to vote for Austria than someone who 
speaks Slovenian. But this impact is certainly not deterministic: more than half 
of those who were considered Slovenian speakers by the census cast a vote to 
join the German-Austrian Republic, and just a bit more than 75 percent of those 
who were reported as speaking German did so as well. These inferences sub-
stantially differ from guesses which are published in the literature: not merely 
10,000 Slovenes supported Austria, but more than 13,000. Effectively, the 
roughly 22,000 voters that opted for Austria were composed of as many as 
13,000 “Slovenes” (about 60%) and only 9,000 “Germans” (roughly 40%).  
Provided that vote choice in the Carinthian plebiscite cannot sufficiently be 
explained by ethnic or linguistic group affiliations, we need to at least briefly 
hint at some alternative explanations. While the list of likely causes laid out 
above is long and complex, the empirical material at hand is limited and restric-
tive. To probe deeper into likely socioeconomic underpinnings of vote choice, 
we utilize data on the number of inhabitants per square kilometer to derive a 
simple indicator of local population density within each community i. The 
underlying rationale is that population density may be utilized as a gross indi-
cator of economic structures as well. Low levels often indicate the presence of 
family farming, while higher densities often imply the emergence of craft pro-
ducers or small industry. 
Figure 6 explores the links of population density with the shares of German-
and Slovene-speaking voters (𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 , , respectively). Note that the green 
values/ smoother indicate the electoral behavior of the German population 
segment, the grey provide similar evidence for the Slovenian segment. General-
ly, both 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 ,  increase with population density so that, regardless of 
affiliation with one or the other group, an individual voter is more likely to cast 
a vote for Austria when she is living in and embedded to the social and eco-
nomic contexts of some larger village or town. 
This also implies that 𝑊 ,  and 𝑊 ,  are clearly correlated and supports our 
utilization of a non-parametric ecological inference model which is able to 
handle these issues.  
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Figure 6: Vote Choice and Population Density 
 
Notes: The green points/ smoother denote the share of linguistic Germans (𝑊 , ), the grey the 
share of linguistic Slovenes voting for Austria (𝑊 , ). 
 
That said, these gross findings summarized in Figure 6 provide some empirical 
backing for the socioeconomic arguments advanced by Moritsch (1981, 2002): 
In small villages that are characterized by the lowest levels of population densi-
ty and mostly inhabited by farmers who indicate to speaking Slovenian, joining 
Austria is not a very popular choice. With increasing levels of population den-
sity we assume with Moritsch (1981) that economic structures gradually shift 
from mere subsistence towards market-oriented farming. In these cases, the 
share of eligible voters who cast a vote in favor of Austria increases either 
slowly (𝑊 , ; the green line indicating linguistic Germans) or even rapidly 
(𝑊 , ; the grey line indicating linguistic Slovenes). Ultimately, in the more 
densely populated towns which are supposedly dominated by craftsmanship 
and petty industry, this effect levels off and the share of votes for Austria often 
falls behind the share of the German-speaking population. One possible expla-
nation would indeed be that market-oriented farmers gravitated towards the 
markets in Austria and the nearby capital Klagenfurt, while those who worked 
in smallscale industry often saw better chances in Yugoslavia. But to demon-
strate this with some empirical validity, further research needs to be done that 
advances the agenda by Moritsch (1981) and systematically explores localized 
social structure and the geographic organization of economic exchange pro-
cesses.  
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Previous accounts are biased by a deterministic fixation on the ethno-
linguistic conflict dimension and result in the bizarre notion that all “Germans” 
want to vote for Austria, unless tricked or threatened by the Yugoslavian civil 
or military administration or the church (cf. Fräss-Ehrfeld 2010; Wutte 1922, 
1943). The “other” side believes that all “Slovenes” must naturally support 
Yugoslavia, unless mislead by social democrats (cf. Pleterski 1970, 2002; 
Pleterski and Druškovǐ 1983). Instead, any meaningful perspective implies to 
adopting an unprejudiced, multidimensional perspective. While we cannot hope 
to evaluate the full catalogue of potential explanations for this historical case, 
the ecological inference models clearly point to the significance of unmodelled 
variables. Further research needs to be done to pursue and empirically review 
the economic and party-political arguments at hand. 
8. Implications and Perspectives 
Historical social science can provide meaningful insights into historical events. 
The initial starting point of this paper was to evaluate and, if necessary, correct 
analyses of the 1920 Carinthian plebiscite which put a dominant, if not exclu-
sive emphasis on ethnic and/ or linguistic dimension of electoral choice. By 
applying a Bayesian, non-parametric ecological inference model, we show that 
the nationalist lens adopted by Carinthian (and also some Yugoslavian/ Slove-
nian) authors yields distorted perspectives on the electoral returns and their 
likely causal determinants.  
The “Carinthian” literature has not cared much about the motives of elec-
toral choice and mainly copied guesses initially published by the German-
nationalist ideologue Wutte (1922, 1943). However, our analysis reveals that 
not 10,000 Slovenian citizens, but rather 13,000 selected to join the new Aus-
trian republic. More than half of the linguistic Slovenes thus supported the 
choice for Austria, and this segment provided almost 60 percent of the overall 
votes cast in favor of Austria. Vice versa, support among the ethnic Germans 
was nowhere, as previously insinuated, close to 100 percent, but rather at 75 
percent. And this also implies that the referendum was the focal point of a 
bitter struggle among nationalist electorates, but instead defined by much sim-
pler, more careful, and more pragmatic considerations of civil liberties, politi-
cal rights, and economic well-being.  
So far, we have demonstrated the limits of the ethnic argument. Further re-
search will be necessary to not merely refute canonized and bitterly defended 
prejudice, but to review alternative explanations in an empirical-systematic 
research program. Unfortunately, ethnic, socioeconomic, religious, and event-
based accounts often tend to be collinear: these predictors regularly overlap 
and, given the rather comparatively low number of observations, i.e., electoral 
communities, cannot always be systematically confined.  
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A feasible way forward could be provided by the more systematic analysis of 
community-level electoral returns which may help to shed some additional light 
on localized political preferences. The political consequences of the socialdemo-
cratic endorsement for Austria are, especially for Slovenian historiography, a 
pivotal issue and should be submitted to more and more systematic research 
efforts. But there are also a number of roadblocks ahead. Conceptually, local, 
state, and nation-wide elections in Carinthia have frequently been neglected and 
characterized by low turnout and high levels of electoral volatility, are organized 
by majoritarian electoral systems and heavily personalized. Empirically, docu-
mentation of these electoral contests is often incomplete. Therefore, further steps 
ahead will certainly require fine-grained documentary effort. 
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Appendix 
Find the replication files here: Guido Tiemann (2020): “Kärnten” = Austria, “Koroška” 
= Yugoslavia? A Novel Perspective on the 1920 Carinthian Plebiscite. GESIS Data 
Archive, Cologne. doi: 10.7802/2109. 
A.  Key Data of the Carinthian Plebiscite 
Table 3 summarizes the key data at hand. The results of the referendum are taken 
from Wutte (1922, 194-5) and Wutte (1943, 471-2). An identical tabular sum-
mary has been copied by Wadl (2019, 178-9). The dataset reports the number of 
enfranchised citizens, the absolute and relative frequecies of votes cast for Aus-
tria and for Yugoslavia. We have recalculated the vote shares based on the raw 
count of voters supporting either option and thereby corrected some minor mis-
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calculations and rounding errors. We have also computed some simple consisten-
cy checks and detected implausible data for the electoral communities of Drau/ 
Drava and Lavamünd/ Labot. For both units, the sum of votes for Austria and 
Yugoslavia that has been noted by the sources cited above exceeds the number of 
eligible voters by four (or, respectively, by eight when we also consider that in 
either district four additional votes were noted as missing or invalid).  
Within the Rosegg/ Rǒcek district (A), Drau/ Drava (2) and Latschach/ Loče 
(3) did not fully match the respective adminitrative communities, because the 
borders of Zone I cut through their territories. The Latschach/ Loče community 
also included the Eastern part of Finkenstein/ Bekštanj. Within the Bleiburg/ 
Pliberk district (C), the electoral community Lavamünd/ Labot (44) comprised of 
parts of Kienberg/ Ojstrica, Lavamünd/ Labot, and Legerbuch. 
Moreover, we have also verified the figures on ethno-linguistic composition of 
the electoral communities as assessed by the Austro-Hungarian census of 1910. 
Wutte (1922, 194-5) merely reports relative frequencies for both linguistic 
groups, the second edition (Wutte 1943) and the more recent publication by Wadl 
(2019) adopt these numbers and, thus, their errors and limitations. We draw upon 
the official census data at the community level which have been compiled in the 
“Spezialortsrepertorium von Kärnten” (Zentralkommission 1918). These detailed 
holdings provide the number of local citizens and the size of the ethno-linguistic 
groups within these communities. In addition, the data include basic de-
mographics such as the number of local citizens and the territorial magnitude of 
the community in sq. kilometers which enable us to distinguish rural areas from 
small towns in Zone I. There is also some information on the share of religious 
denominations, the proximity to the public railway network, and the shares of 
male and female inhabitants. 
 
Table 3: Community-Level Data on Ethno-Linguistic Composition and Vote Choice in the 1920 Cainthian Plebiscite 
  Community Demographics   Wutte (1922, 1943) 
No. Dist. Name (Ger.) Name (Slov.) Pop. dens. gg gs gg (%) gs (%) pev vat vshs vat (%) vshs (%) 
1 A Augsdorf Loga vas 0.84 85 1221 5.40 94.60 651 262 344 43.23 56.77 
2 A Drau Drava    50.60 49.40 3891 252 141 64.12 35.88 
3 A Latschach Loče    36.60 63.40 663 228 410 35.74 64.26 
4 A Ledenitzen Ledince 0.37 37 1132 3.20 96.80 591 233 327 41.61 58.39 
5 A Rosegg Roček 0.68 173 433 28.50 71.50 321 189 128 59.62 40.38 
6 A St. Jacob Šentjakob 0.45 360 3176 10.20 89.80 1893 816 968 45.74 54.26 
7 B Ebental Žrelec 0.55 635 654 74.50 25.50 245 165 80 67.35 32.65 
8 B Feistritz i.R. Bistrica v Rožu 0.32 715 893 44.50 55.50 947 410 500 45.05 54.95 
9 B Ferlach Borovlje 1.03 2825 322 89.80 10.20 1708 1235 468 72.52 27.48 
10 B Keutschach Hodiše 0.42 85 1081 7.40 92.60 598 304 274 52.60 47.40 
11 B Köttmannsdorf Kotmara vas 0.57 614 828 42.60 57.40 794 449 272 62.27 37.73 
12 B Ludmannsdorf Bilčovs 0.37 30 725 3.90 96.10 438 86 331 20.62 79.38 
13 B Maria Rain Žihpolje 0.43 732 317 69.80 30.20 607 428 142 75.09 24.91 
14 B Maria Wörth Otok 0.36 366 264 57.70 42.30 375 248 116 68.13 31.87 
15 B Mieger Medgorje 0.36 37 932 3.80 96.20 522 383 106 78.32 21.68 
 
16 B Oberdörfl Zgornja Vesca 0.43 35 349 9.60 90.40 214 63 139 31.19 68.81 
17 B Radsberg Radiše 0.37 213 498 29.90 70.10 383 181 188 49.05 50.95 
18 B Schiefling Škoficĕ 0.45 73 1198 5.70 94.30 664 354 286 55.31 44.69 
19 B St. Margareten Šmarjeta 0.26 87 1065 7.50 92.50 607 291 279 51.05 48.95 
20 B Unterferlach Medborovnica 0.73 375 721 34.20 65.80 558 315 225 58.33 41.67 
21 B Unterloibl Podljubelj 0.72 785 789 49.80 50.20 916 558 315 63.92 36.08 
22 B Viktring Vetrinj 0.85 1294 237 84.50 15.50 910 703 152 82.22 17.78 
23 B Weizelsdorf Svetna vas 0.43 101 794 11.30 88.70 516 166 321 34.09 65.91 
24 B Wind. Bleiberg Slovenji Plajberk 0.16 27 749 3.50 96.50 375 71 276 20.46 79.54 
25 B Zell Sele 0.14 13 1014 1.30 98.70 566 17 511 3.22 96.78 
26 C Bleiburg Pliberk 3.95 927 124 88.20 11.80 562 414 136 75.27 24.73 
27 C Eberndorf Dobrla vas 0.43 599 2196 21.40 78.60 1625 985 505 66.11 33.89 
28 C Eisenkappel Železna Kapla 5.30 847 303 73.60 26.40 612 381 181 67.79 32.21 
29 C Feistritz Bistrica pri Pliberku 0.38 18 1841 0.90 99.10 1070 355 653 35.22 64.78 
30 C Gallizien Galicija 0.27 21 1029 2.00 98.00 559 391 156 71.48 28.52 
31 C Globasnitz Globasnica 0.37 21 1264 1.60 98.40 708 314 366 46.18 53.82 
32 C Leifling Libeliče 0.45 160 1783 7.50 92.50 704 290 387 42.84 57.16 
33 C Loibach Libuče 0.43 153 1607 11.90 88.10 681 286 348 45.11 54.89 
34 C Moos Blato 0.36 32 1451 2.20 97.80 807 115 650 15.03 84.97 
 
35 C Rückersdorf Rikarja vas 0.49 98 1687 5.50 94.50 997 607 327 64.99 35.01 
36 C Schwabegg Žvabek 0.37 5 440 1.10 98.90 260 61 183 25.00 75.00 
37 C Sittersdorf Žitara vas 0.42 170 1360 11.10 88.90 796 474 317 59.92 40.08 
38 C St. Kanzian Škocjan 0.53 166 1019 14.00 86.00 701 358 298 54.57 45.43 
39 C Vellach Bela 0.12 85 2676 3.20 96.80 1507 281 1029 21.45 78.55 
40 D Diex Djekše 0.32 197 1404 12.30 87.70 904 507 273 65.00 35.00 
41 D Grafenstein Grabštanj 0.48 922 918 50.10 49.90 968 832 112 88.14 11.86 
42 D Griffen Grebinj 0.61 841 2344 26.80 73.20 1786 1290 380 77.25 22.75 
43 D Haimburg Vovbre 0.53 344 1158 22.90 77.10 795 443 310 58.83 41.17 
44 D Lavamünd Labot 0.63 1476 63 96.90 3.10 7681 717 55 92.88 7.12 
45 D Poggersdorf Pokrče 0.47 600 859 45.40 54.60 726 574 134 81.07 18.93 
46 D Pustritz Pustritz 0.32 1122 3 99.70 0.30 674 634 21 96.79 3.21 
47 D Ruden Ruda 0.36 204 1330 13.30 86.70 823 505 285 63.92 36.08 
48 D St. Peter Šentpeter 0.38 63 1063 5.60 94.40 627 347 251 58.03 41.97 
49 D Tainach Tinje 0.45 147 449 24.70 75.30 324 269 44 85.94 14.06 
50 D Völkermarkt Velikovec 2.37 2079 518 80.60 19.40 1424 1154 229 83.44 16.56 
51 D Waisenberg Važenberk 0.48 1003 1861 35.00 65.00 1423 1026 349 74.62 25.38 
Notes: Key columns of our dataset adopted from Zentralkommission 1918; Wutte 1922, 1943. Note that the data prepared by Wutte suffers from some incon-
sistencies. Notably, in the newly established electoral districts of Drau/ Drava and Lavamünd/ Labot (1) the number of votes for Austria, Yugoslavia, and the 
invalid votes/ abstentions exceed (!) the number of persons entitled to vote. 
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We provide a brief definition and overview of the variables listed in Table 3: 
Table 4: Variables, Definitions, and Sources for the Community-Level Data in 
Table 3 
Variable Description 
No. Running no. to identify and label community; 
Dist. Regional districts of Rosegg/ Rožek (A.), Ferlach/ Borovlje (B.), Bleiburg/ 
Pliberk (C.), and Völkermarkt/ Velikovec (D.); 
Name (Ger.) Name of administrative community (German); 
Name (Slov.) Name of administrative community (Slovenian); 
Pop. dens. Population density; inhabitants/ km2; Zentralkommission 1918; 𝑔   Number of linguistic Germans; Zentralkommission 1918; 𝑔   Number of linguistic Slovenes; Zentralkommission 1918; 𝑔 (%)  Share of linguistic Germans; corrected numbers from Wutte, 1943; 𝑔  (%) Share of linguistic Slovenes; corrected numbers from Wutte, 1943; 
pev Number of persons entitled to vote; Wutte, 1943; 𝑣   Absolute number of votes for Austria; Wutte, 1943; 𝑣   Absolute number of votes for Yugoslavia; Wutte, 1943; 𝑣 (%)  Vote share for Austria; Wutte, 1943; 𝑣 (%)  Vote share for Yugoslavia; Wutte, 1943. 
 
This appendix provides some graphical and numerical tests for the convergence 
and the mixing of the diverse chains specified in the MCMC estimation/ simula-
tion routines. Focussing on the non-parametric models which have been laid out 
and explained above, we cannot evaluate any model parameters, but instead focus 
upon chains of out-of-sample predictions for our key quantities 𝑊 and 𝑊 . 
Figure 7 displays trace plots, i.e., time series of posteriors produced by non-
paramatric Gibbs samplers/ the MCMC process for each of the two key quanti-
ties W1 and W2. Note that the displayed chains are based on four chains, each 
with N = 500,000 iterations of a non-parametric ecological inference model and 
an initial burn-in of N = 250,000 iterations. So as to address potential autocor-
relation or non-linearities, we apply a thinning interval, record and evaluate 
only every 200th run of the MCMC process. Some brief inspection of Figure 7 
immediately reveals that each of the four chains (identified by different colors) 
appears to be stationary for both 𝑊  and 𝑊 , and, in addition, mixing/ overlap 
of chains with different sets of initial values is quick and substantial. 
In addition to these visual diagnostics, we have also computed an array of 
numerical tests which probe stationarity and mixing. Table 5 compiles a sum-
mary of these alternative test statistics. We first address stationarity of the four 
chains by the Geweke convergence diagnostics. This implies a simple t-test for 
the equality of means in the first (by default 10%) and last parts (by default 
50%) of each chain. The Geweke test returns a z-score which should be strictly 
below 1 for any chain, and the values in the first two columns of Table 5 indeed 
confirm the convergence of the MCMC processes for both the predictions of 𝑊  and 𝑊 . The complementary Heidelberger-Welsch diagnostics tests the null 
hypothesis that the sampled values are taken from a stationary distribution; it is 
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initially applied to the whole chain and then to the first 10%, 20%, etc. until 
either the null hypothesis is accepted (“success”) or more than 50 % of the 
chain are discarded (“failure”). 
Figure 7:  Trace Plot of 𝑊  and 𝑊  
 
Notes: Graphical MCMC diagnostics, trace plots, for a Bayesian non-parametric ecological 
inference model, simulated with the eco package (Imai, Lu, and Strauss 2011; Lu 2017). We 
specify four chains, each with an initial burn-in of N = 250,000 iterations, but different start-
ing values; we save N = 250,000 iterations per chain for further analysis and apply a thinning 
interval of 200. 
Table 5: MCMC Diagnostics, Geweke, Heidelberg-Welsch, and Gelman Tests 
 Geweke Test H-W Test Gelman Test 
 𝑊1 𝑊2 𝑊1 𝑊2 𝑊1 𝑊2 
Chain 1 -0.36 0.54 0.58 0.46 1.00 1.00 
Chain 2 0.40 -1.50 0.33 0.14 1.00 1.00 
Chain 3 0.31 0.64 0.36 0.66 1.00 1.00 
Chain 4 -0.65 0.11 0.46 0.87 1.00 1.00 
Notes: MCMC diagnostics for a Bayesian non-parametric ecological inference model, simulated 
with the “eco” package (Imai, Lu, and Strauss 2011; Lu 2017). For the Geweke test, we show z-
scores, for the Heidelberger-Welsch diagnostics, we display 95% error intervals, for the Gelman 
test, we report the Gelman-Rubin statistic 𝑅  (cf. Gelman and Rubin 1992). 
 
In the subsequent step, we advance from analyses within each of the four 
chains to formal tests that evaluate the overlap across these chains. The two 
rightmost columns of Table 5 display the upper limits of the Gelman-Rubin 
diagnostic and assesses the average within-chains and between chains variance 
with large differences indicating non-convergence. Both for 𝑊  and 𝑊 , the 
values of the Gelman-Rubin test statistic 𝑅  are effectively one and below the 
upper limit of the computed confidence interval 𝑅 [𝑊 ] = 1 and 𝑅 [𝑊 ] = 1.01, 
respectively. We can thus conclude that the four chains have properly con-
verged and mixed. 
Ultimately, the test statistics in Table 6 address autocorrelation issues. By 
definition, each MCMC process is affected by autocorrelation, but excessive 
levels of and persistent trends in ρ indicate slow mixing. The parameters ρ 
clearly confirm that, after burn-in, the simulation processes for both 𝑊  and 𝑊  
are stationary series. 
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Table 6: MCMC Diagnostics, Autocorrelation Tests 
 Autocorrelation Test 𝜌[𝑊 ] 𝜌[𝑊 ]
Lag 0 1.00000000 1.00000000 
Lag 10,000 0.17733235 0.01044720 
Lag 50,000 0.18319582 0.03287475 
Lag 100,000 0.15991755 0.02285381 
Lag 500,000 −0.01507015 −0.02054920 
Notes: The test statistics characterize the autocorrelation coefficients ρ of W1 and W2 and the 
respective auto-correlation functions. 
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